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Ontological Models for Quantum Mechanics and the Kochen-Specker theorem
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Certain concrete “ontological models” for quantum mechanics (models in which measurement
outcomes are deterministic and quantum states are equivalent to classical probability distributions
over some space of ‘hidden variables’) are examined. The models are generalizations of Kochen
and Specker’s such model for a single 2-dimensional system - in particular a model for a three
dimensional quantum system is considered in detail. Unfortunately, it appears the models do not
quite reproduce the quantum mechanical statistics. They do, however, come close to doing so, and
in as much as they simply involve probability distributions over the complex projective space they
do reproduce pretty much everything else in quantum mechanics.
The Kochen-Specker theorem is examined in the light of these models, and the rather mild nature
of the manifested contextuality is discussed.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
If it is the case that orthodox quantum mechanics
(QM) is an incomplete description of nature, then sev-
eral puzzling aspects of the theory become less so: The
role of conscious observers in the theory and collapse of
the wavefunction being the preeminent examples1. It is
well appreciated that the Bell [1] and Kochen-Specker [2]
theorems significantly constrain any attempts at a more
complete description. The KS theorem in particular is
often taken as implying that any ‘complete’ description
of reality must be so strange that such attempts should
automatically be abandoned. It seems to me, however,
that the KS theorem tells us only that the outcomes of
experiments must depend on the physical properties of
both the measurement apparatus and the system under
investigation - it provides evidence against the most dra-
matic form of reductionism. This raises the question:
Without such reductionism at hand, must any complete
description be so complicated that Occams razor neces-
sitates its abandonment? One purpose of this note is to
show how a theory can be contextual without becoming
particularly complicated, and without requiring a deep
understanding of the dynamics of measurement processes
in the theory.
I will be concerned here with the possible existence of
what will briefly be termed ontological models (OM’s) -
models which ideally reproduce the quantum predictions
and have the following features: Firstly, all the physical
properties of an individual system are presumed to be de-
termined by (or determinable from) some mathematical
object λ (the “ontic state” or “hidden variable”2 of the
1 For example, no one is paid to lie awake at night puzzling about
the role of conscious observers and ‘collapses’ due to updating of
information in classical Liouville mechanics. Arguments in favor
of this viewpoint have a long history, with early advocates such
as Jaynes and Pierls. More recent arguments can be found in [3].
2 I will avoid using the term ‘hidden variable’ - in addition to being
system) which is an element of a space of such objects Λ.
The quantum mechanical wavefunction |ψ〉 , an element
of a d dimensional Hilbert space H(d), is presumed an in-
complete description of this underlying reality, and thus
corresponds in the OM to a probability density over Λ :
|ψ〉 ⇐⇒ Pψ (λ) dλ. (1)
Note that unlike the commonly utilized representations
of quantum systems in terms of quasi-probability distri-
butions, which can become negative, this probability den-
sity is presumed positive and normalized with respect to
some appropriate measure on Λ. Crucially, in OM’s the
probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical predictions
arises only from such classical uncertainty.
Secondly, measurement outcomes in OM’s are deter-
ministic. As such, if an N outcome measurement is per-
formed which in QM is described by a (complete) set of
orthogonal projection operators {Πi}Ni=1, then for a sys-
tem in ontological state λ there is a unique one of these
N outcomes which will always be obtained. That is, if
the value of λ was known then the outcome which would
be obtained is determinable. One can therefore divide
the space Λ up into N subspaces according to which of
the measurement outcomes each λ ∈ Λ is associated with.
Mathematically we define N different characteristic func-
tions {χi(λ)}Ni=1 over Λ, which take the value 1 over the
values of λ which yield the particular outcome, and which
are 0 otherwise3. Thus the probability of any particular
of bad repute in certain circles, some of the ontological models
considered here have the same “unhidden” variables as regular
quantum mechanics!
3 For notational simplicity I am avoiding writing the characteristic
function corresponding to Πi as χi(λ; {Πj 6=i}) which would more
accurately reflect the possibility of contextuality, i.e. that the
full set of measurement operators must be known in order to
determine whether the system will give outcome i or not.
2measurement outcome is given by the correspondence:
〈ψ|Πi |ψ〉 ⇐⇒
∫
Pψ(λ)χi(λ)dλ. (2)
Finally, certain other assumptions necessarily lurk in
the background of OM descriptions of QM. The first is
quite reasonable: What corresponds to the Schro¨dinger
evolution of the system is some sort of transformation of
the ontological state space Λ into itself. The second is
less simple: Measurements must disturb the ontological
state of the system. A non-disturbing measurement of
some outcome i would result in the observer assigning
the posterior distribution to the system:
Pi(λ)dλ =
χi(λ)Pψ(λ)dλ∫
Pψ(λ)χi(λ)dλ
.
However a sequence of such non-disturbing measure-
ments would generally allow the observer to narrow down
their description of the system in such a way that they ob-
tain more predictability than we know to be the case for
QM. Thus it is presumed that upon measurement an im-
precisely understood disturbance occurs which forces an
observer to “smear” the post-measurement distribution
they assign. Note that this smearing necessarily happens
only over states which lie in supp(χi(λ)), the support of
the characteristic function (i.e. the region over which the
function is non-zero), because we know empirically that
(in the absence of intermediate evolution) a second mea-
surement containing the same projector Πi must yield
this same outcome with certainty.
It is not known whether or not there exist OM’s satisfy-
ing all of the above for an arbitrary dimensional quantum
system. Kochen and Specker found such a model for a
spin-1/2 (qubit) system - their model is reviewed in the
next section. Subsequently I go on to examine similar
models for a three dimensional (qutrit) system, models
which unfortunately do not exactly reproduce the quan-
tum predictions. They do, however, come damn close.
Since the KS theorem applies in three and higher dimen-
sions it is interesting to see the manner in which these
models manifest contextuality, as one suspects they must
if they are to come as close to QM as they seem to do.
II. ONTOLOGICAL MODEL FOR A QUBIT
A. Kochen and Specker’s “Marble World”
We begin with a simple and concrete model which re-
produces the operational predictions of the quantum me-
chanics of a qubit. We then formalize this model a lit-
tle, which enables us to see how it can be generalized to
higher dimensional systems.
Our initial simple model, that we call “marble world”,
consists of a marble constrained to move on the surface
of a sphere. Λ is then the set of points of a unit sphere,
and a generic element λ can be parameterised as a vec-
tor [sin θ cosφ, sin θ sinφ, cos θ] in the usual manner. Ob-
servers of marble world systems are somehow constrained
- they can never know the location of the marble exactly.
In fact, the best they can do is to assign a probability
distribution P~n (λ) over the space Λ. Here ~n is a (fixed)
unit vector which labels the distribution. Specifically,
P~n (λ) dλ = (2(λ · ~n)2 − 1)dλ if λ · ~n ≥ 0
= 0 otherwise
Thus P~n (λ) is a cosine distribution peaked at ~n and hav-
ing support only on the hemisphere defined by ~n - it
corresponds to the quantum mechanical pure state with
Bloch vector ~n. dλ is the standard uniform measure over
the sphere.
Measurements in marble world consist of the following:
The sphere is observed from antipodal directions and the
hemisphere in which the marble is actually located is
noted. For concreteness imagine measurements are per-
formed by means of different colored lights (say red and
green) being turned on above antipodal points ~m, ~m⊥ of
the sphere. If the marble is in the hemisphere illumi-
nated by the green (resp. red) light it scatters a green
(resp. red) photon which is registered by the observer. It
is not hard to verify that the probability of this scatter-
ing is cos2 α (resp. sin2 α) where α is the angle between
~n and ~m (resp. ~m⊥). Thus the quantum mechanical
statistics (i.e. the Born rule) are easily reproduced. In
the language of the introduction the characteristic func-
tion χ~m(λ) is simply the function with value 1 over the
hemisphere centered around ~m and 0 over the opposite
hemisphere.
In order to make marble world correspond more closely
to QM we need to presume two other features: Firstly,
we presume that a marble scattering light is disturbed in
such a way that after a measurement with outcome χ~m
the probability distribution an observer should assign the
post-measurement likelihood of the marble’s location is
simply P~m (λ) dλ. (E.g. the marble could be “attracted”
to the light source it sees, and so the new distribution be-
comes peaked at the point of greatest intensity, namely
~m. Interestingly, in this particular example the intensity
distribution of the light over the hemisphere will actu-
ally match the presumed cosine probability distribution!)
Secondly we must presume the dynamics in the theory
takes the form of rotating the sphere “underneath” the
marble so as to exactly mimic Schro¨dinger evolution. In
this way marble world exhibits all features of the physics
of a single qubit.
B. The SU(2) version of Kochen and Specker’s
model
Because of the SU(2) double covering of SO(3) it is not
hard to turn the marble world description into a slightly
more formal OM for a qubit, and it is this more formal
3model which is more easily generalized to higher dimen-
sional systems.
The ontological state space Λ consists of all rank 1 pro-
jectors in GL(2,C) (More precisely, it is the complex pro-
jective space upon which SU(2) acts transitively). The
standard distance measure between λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ (inducing
the Frobenius norm) is
d(λ1, λ2) = 1− Tr (λ1λ2) .
Let λψ be the element of Λ which is mathematically iden-
tical to the matrix |ψ〉〈ψ| corresponding to quantum state
|ψ〉 ∈ H(2) in some fixed (but otherwise arbitrary) basis.
In the ontological model the representation of a system
in the quantum state |ψ〉 is the probability density
Pψ(λ)dλ = N
(
Tr(λλψ)− 1
2
)
dλ if Tr(λλψ) ≥ 1
2
= 0 otherwise, (3)
where N is a normalization constant, and dλ denotes a
suitable measure - in this case it is proportional to the
standard SU(2) invariant Haar measure. This distribu-
tion is centered on (and peaked at) λψ, and it has support
over all elements of Λ which are less than a distance 1/2
away from this point.
Since the model is deterministic, we need to spec-
ify for each λ which outcome will be obtained when a
measurement is performed that is described in QM by
von-Neumann projection operators {Π0 = |0〉〈0|,Π1 =
|1〉〈1|}. If we denote by λ0 and λ1 the elements of Λ
which are identical to the quantum mechanical matrices
Π0,Π1 then we can define characteristic functions over
Λ:
χ0(λ) = Θ
(
Tr(λ0λ)− 1
2
)
(4)
χ1(λ) = Θ
(
Tr(λ1λ)− 1
2
)
, (5)
where Θ is the Heaviside step function. Heuristically
then, a generic λ ∈ Λ gives the outcome to which it is
closest. We refer to the elements λ0, λ1 as the “central el-
ements” of the measurement outcomes, since they are at
the centers of the characteristic functions, and moreover
the “decision” a system makes about which outcome to
give is determined with respect to these elements.
It is readily verified that with the above construction
one obtains the exact correspondence
〈ψ|Πb |ψ〉 ⇐⇒
∫
Pψ(λ)χb(λ)dλ for b = 0, 1.
Again, in order to allow this ontological model to re-
produce the rest of familiar quantum mechanics for a
qubit we must postulate that any measurement disturbs
the system in such a way that post-measurement an ob-
server’s best posterior probability distribution is the one
centred on λb (i.e. PΠb(λ)) according to the outcome χb
she obtained. We must also allow that coupling of the
system to classical fields causes an evolution in the ontic
state space Λ which amounts to application of an SU(2)
rotation - as per Schro¨dinger evolution in QM.
Note that I have been very explicit about differentiat-
ing between the hidden variable space Λ and the Hilbert
space (or projective space) in which QM is formulated -
despite the fact that mathematically for this particular
OM they are identical spaces! This is partly for concep-
tual reasons, and partly because later I will look at de-
scribing a d-dimensional quantum system by an OM that
is not formulated over the d-dimensional Hilbert space,
but rather is formulated in a higher dimensional Hilbert
space.
It has been known since the seminal work of Kochen
and Specker that ontological models for systems which
are described in QM by Hilbert spaces of dimension
greater than two must be measurement contextual. The
KS model for a qubit is actually trivially non-contextual.
This can be seen from the expressions for the charac-
teristic functions (4): a system in an ontic state λ can
tell whether or not it is going to “give” the outcome Π0
(say) without having to know what other measurement
outcomes (of course there is only one!) are being mea-
sured simultaneously with Π0.
I will now describe a very similar model for a qutrit,
and then in the next section examine how measurement
contextuality is manifested in the model.
III. QUTRIT MODEL I
For this qutrit model the ontological state space Λ con-
sists of all rank 1 projectors in GL(3,C). As above, the
distance measure between λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ is
d(λ1, λ2) = 1− Tr (λ1λ2) .
and the representation of |ψ〉 (now an element of H(3))
in the ontological model is the probability density
Pψ(λ)dλ = N (Tr(λλψ)−∆) dλ if Tr(λλψ) ≥ ∆
= 0 otherwise, (6)
where N is a (different) normalization constant and dλ is
now proportional to the SU(3) invariant Haar measure.
Note that a new parameter ∆ has been introduced, which
essentially determines how large the support of the prob-
ability distribution corresponding to the quantum state
is.
When a measurement that is quantum mechanically
described by von-Neumann projection operators {Π0 =
|0〉〈0|,Π1 = |1〉〈1|,Π2 = |2〉〈2|} is performed then a sys-
tem in a generic state λ gives the outcome according to
which of the corresponding central elements λ0, λ1, or λ2
it is closest to. More formally, such a measurement is
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FIG. 1: Comparison between OM and QM predictions
for the first qutrit model; the two figures are for differ-
ent ∆. The quantum state in the measurement basis is
|ψ〉 = [cos θ, sin θ, 0], thus the QM predctions for outcomes
0 and 1 are cos2 θ, sin2 θ. The blue crosses correspond to the
probability of the Π2 outcome which in QM is exactly 0.
described by the characterisitic functions:
χ0(λ) = Θ (Tr(λλ0)− Tr(λλ1)) Θ (Tr(λλ0)− Tr(λλ2))
χ1(λ) = Θ (Tr(λλ1)− Tr(λλ0)) Θ (Tr(λλ1)− Tr(λλ2))
χ2(λ) = Θ (Tr(λλ2)− Tr(λλ0)) Θ (Tr(λλ2)− Tr(λλ1)) .
It is not simple to analytically examine the extent to
which the desired correspondence of Eq. (2) is satisfied,
because of the complexity of parameterizing the integra-
tion regions.4 As such I simply do the integrations nu-
merically by a monte-carlo method. It turns out that
4 I should point out that the paper [5] has been particularly helpful
for obtaining explicit parameterizations of the group manifold for
the small amount of analytic work I have done.
this OM does not reproduce the quantum statistics per-
fectly - i.e. the correspondence of Eq. (2) is not exactly
satisfied. Empirically I find that the maximum deviation
from the quantum prediction occurs when the quantum
state lies in a 2-dimensional subspace spanned by two
of the three considered measurement outcomes. That is,
taking |ψ〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 and then examining the
probabilities for obtaining outcomes {Π0 = |0〉〈0|,Π1 =
|1〉〈1|,Π2 = |2〉〈2|} gives by far the largest deviations
from the quantum predictions. These deviations can be
succinctly plotted as in Fig. 1. In the figure the black
lines correspond to the standard quantum mechanical
cos2 θ and sin2 θ predictions for outcomes Π0 and Π1.
The red and green crosses are the corresponding predic-
tions of the OM. Note that while the probability of the
Π2 outcome is strictly 0 in QM, in the OM it is finite (the
blue crosses). The figure shows the curves for two differ-
ent values of ∆. There is nothing particularly special
about 1/
√
3 - I have not had the patience (the monte-
carlo integrations take quite a while) to find the actual
optimal choice, but trying a few values and comparing
“by eye” it seems close to the optimal.
Note that the reason the probability of obtaining the
χ2 outcome is non-zero in the OM is that whenever ∆ <
2/3 there exist λ which are closer to λ2 than λ0, λ1 but
which are still close enough to λψ (for θ ≈ π/4) to lie
within the support of Pψ(λ). Why then not choose ∆ =
2/3? Doing so seems to cause the other curves to deviate
more from the quantum predictions. There are a large
variety of “tweaks” of this model that one can imagine,
and I do not have the computing power (or patience) to
find optimal parameter choices for each such tweak.
Before I go on to describe a different OM that I per-
sonally find more appealing than this first qutrit version,
I am going to digress a little and talk about the Kochen-
Specker theorem and this particular OM. This is because
although this model does not exactly reproduce QM, I
believe the sort of manner in which it manifests contex-
tuality is quite natural and much more benign than the
dramatic statements one often sees about the implica-
tions of the Kochen-Specker theorem for realist interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics might lead one believe.
IV. THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
One of the most profound restrictions on interpreta-
tions of QM is provided by the Kochen-Specker theorem,
which holds for three or more dimensional quantum sys-
tems. The OM of the previous section exhibits the con-
textuality required by the KS theorem in the following
way. Consider two different complete (projection-valued)
measurements in QM: {Π0,Π1,Π2} and {Π0,Π′1,Π′2}.
Recall that our rule assignment to an arbitrary element λ
is that a system in state λ gives the outcome correspond-
ing to the central element to which it is closest. Now,
there exist some ontological states λ that are closer to λ0
than to λ1, λ2, but which are closer to one of λ
′
1, λ
′
2 than
5FIG. 2: A real space analogue depicting a quadrant of the
space Λ and three orthogonal “central elements” λ0, λ1, and
λ2. The regions of ontic states closest to each such element
are bounded by the red curves. The ontic states which always
give the Π0 outcome regardless of their context are indicated
as “faithful”. The set of faithful states also forms supp(P0(λ))
for the particular choice of ∆ = 1/2.
to λ0.
This can be seen simply by means of the 3 dimen-
sional real space analogue in Figure 1, which loosely cor-
responds to the ∆ = 1/2 version of the qutrit OM de-
scribed above. In the figure the three orthogonal unit
vectors represent λ0, λ1 and λ2, and the quadrant of
the sphere depicted is part of the space Λ. The red
lines depict the boundaries of the supports of the char-
acteristic functions χb(λ) - that is, elements λ within the
red boundary are closest to the appropriate vector λb.
Clearly if the space is rotated around λ0 to obtain a new
set of vectors λ0, λ
′
1, λ
′
2 then those points λ ∈ Λ which
lie in the region marked “unfaithful” will change the out-
come they are associated with from λ0 to either λ
′
1 or λ
′
2.
We will refer to elements λ which always give outcome
λ0 as “faithful” to λ0.
Thus the measurement outcomes in the OM are con-
textual: sometimes (interestingly, however, not all the
time) the system is in an ontic state λ for which knowl-
edge of all three measurement outcomes being measured
simultaneously is required in order to determine which
outcome will be obtained. That is, the probability of a
specific outcome depends on its context.
I now proffer the opinion that the contextuality of this
OM does not, however, encumber us with the concep-
tual problems which are often associated with under-
standing the implications of the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem. Roughly speaking, these puzzling implications are
usually taken to be that the theorem presents an obstruc-
tion to our making sense of the system “having values”
of certain physical quantities which are subsequently re-
vealed by measurements. The OM sidesteps these con-
ceptual issues because it is, in some sense, relational.
More precisely, we should expect that a more complete
description of measurements would involve consideration
of the ontic states associated with the measurement appa-
ratus, and it is not unreasonable that the response of the
system to a measurement depends on the relationship be-
tween the ontic state of the apparatus and the ontic state
of the system. Because the measurements {Π0,Π1,Π2}
and {Π0,Π′1,Π′2} involve different physical arrangements,
we should expect that the corresponding ontic states of
the measurement apparatus itself are different. Without
the more complete description we do not (yet) have a
proper description of the apparatus’ ontic states. How-
ever, since in our OM the measurement outcome is de-
termined solely by the relationship between the central
elements and the actual state λ of the system, it is quite
uncontroversial to view the central elements {λ0, λ1, λ2}
or {λ0, λ′1, λ′2} as in a natural correspondence with these
(as yet undetermined) apparatus ontic states.
Now, physics would be an extremely difficult endeavor
if we needed to know everything about the measurement
apparatuses and the systems under investigation to form
a coherent understanding of the world - in effect we need
the simplifications afforded by the implicit reductionism
which allows us to talk about systems at all. The KS
theorem denies us the most extreme form of reduction-
ism. However, in the sort of OM discussed here we obtain
the next best thing: we do not need to know everything
about the highly complex physical reality of the macro-
scopic measurement devices - we need only know that
the important features of the apparatus for the purposes
of understanding its role as a measuring device can be
encapsulated in the simple mathematical objects {λi},
which form the central elements of the measurement.
One upshot of this is that the quantum projector Π0
is always associated with a unique central element λ0.
In [6] Spekkens showed how contextuality could be de-
fined operationally (and thus for any physical theory, not
just quantum mechanics) in terms of the redundancies in
the mathematical description of one theory by another.
Such mathematical redundancy is certainly present at the
level of characteristic functions in this OM: there are a
continuous infinity of characteristic functions χ0(λ) cor-
responding to Π0, one for each of the continuous infin-
ity of possibly co-measured projectors (corresponding to
the different rotations about the λ0 axis in Fig. 2). If
we quantify contextuality by simply counting this redun-
dancy, then this OM is highly contextual. In my opinion,
however, the contextuality of the model is ameliorated
by the fact that there is no need to have a large math-
ematical redundancy in the ontic states {λ0, λ1, λ2}, the
relations to which represent “actual physical quantities”.
Looking at this another way, there is a simplicity in the
mathematical rules from which the contextual measure-
ment outcomes are determinable. It is not as if we have
to compile a huge table of different outcomes for each of
the different possible measurements and all possible in-
put ontic states. It seems likely to me that at the level of
6just counting ‘representation redundancies’ all OM’s will
need to be infinitely (preparation and measurement) con-
textual5. Some models will manifest that contextuality
in a more simple and natural way than others.
A final word about relationalism. There is a large body
of work advocating identification of relational “elements
of reality” in classical physical theories - General Rel-
ativity in particular. Even in terms of non-relativistic
QM, however, it should be realized that the quantum
mechanical wavefunction is itself devoid of operational
meaning unless the experimentalist understands which
external devices the relative phases in a particular su-
perposition are defined with respect to. It is perhaps
not too much of a stretch to see contextuality in general
as simply a reflection of this essential feature of physics.
The puzzle then becomes why it is that classical physics
is non-contextual.
V. ONTOLOGICAL MODELS WITH UNIFORM
PROBABILITY DENSITIES
Upon first exposure to the Kochen-Specker qubit
model of section II my initial reaction was to feel slightly
cheated with regard to the manner in which the Born rule
is obtained. That is, the specific choice of a cosine distri-
bution peaked at the corresponding quantum mechanical
Bloch vector is clearly what leads directly to the quantum
mechanical “cos2” type of probability distribution.
If some sort of OM really does underpin QM, then we
should expect that the probability density would take
some “natural” form. In fact there are very few proba-
bility densities which arise naturally in physics - and the
ones which do (such as the Gibbs distribution) tend to be
understandable in terms of an application of a maximum
entropy principle. In looking for OM’s there is a fur-
ther intuition at play - namely that many of the strange
features of quantum mechanics are derivable from us as
observers being subject to an encompassing epistemic re-
striction (See e.g. [6] for much more on this sort of thing).
It seems intuitive that such restrictions would generally
lead to assignment of uniform probability distributions
over the ‘hidden’ variables. (Again, see [6] for this type
of thing at play).
There is another point in favor of looking for uniform
distributions: As has been mentioned several times, ‘col-
lapse’ - viewed as an updating of knowledge in an OM -
is still necessarily accompanied by physical disturbance.
Collapses which induce a “disturbing dynamics” that
then leads to a new assignment of some strange probabil-
ity density function would presumably have to be quite
specialized. Given the variety of systems to which QM
applies this seems somewhat unlikely. Thus I have spent
some time looking for OM’s which, like the above mod-
5 Though this is not easy to prove - just ask Nicholas Harrigan!
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d=2    ∆=1/√3    dΛ=3
FIG. 3: The probabilities of obtaining Π0 = |0〉〈0|,Π1 =
|1〉〈1| for a qubit in state |ψ〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉. The black
curves are the QM predictions, the crosses are the probabili-
ties for an OM based on uniform probability distributions in
a 3-dimensional ontic state space.
els, preserve much of the Hilbert space structure of QM,
but which don’t require assigning some sort of contrived
probability density in order to conform closely to QM.6
Here is one example of an OM which only involves uni-
form distributions. We let the quantum system which has
dimension d be described in an ontic space Λ consisting
of all rank 1 projectors in GL(dΛ,C), where dΛ > d. (In
fact for the examples presented here I’ll take dλ = d+1.)
Corresponding to the quantum state |ψ〉〈ψ| there is an
element λψ ∈ Λ defined via:
λψ =
[ |ψ〉〈ψ| 0
0 0
]
(i.e. the bottom right block is (dΛ − d) × (dΛ − d) di-
mensional). This is simply choosing λψ exactly equal to
|ψ〉〈ψ| on a fixed d-dimensional subspace of Λ. Elements
λi corresponding to the QM measurement projectors Πi
can similarly be defined.
The probability density corresponding to quantum
state |ψ〉 is then
Pψ(λ)dλ = Ndλ if Tr(λλψ) ≥ ∆
= 0 otherwise, (7)
Note that I am leaving in the parameter ∆ which deter-
mines the size of the support of Pψ(λ)dλ.
The rule for determining measurement outcomes (and
therefore the characteristic functions) are unchanged
from that of the qutrit model discussed previously.
6 The preservation of as much of the Hilbert space structure is
important: for example, it means that I do not have to look
for new Hamiltonians (or some new equivalent thereof) - unitary
evolution can still be the basic form of evolution in the OM, and
the spectrum of hydrogen can go unchanged...
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FIG. 4: An equivalent plot to Fig. 2, but now for a qutrit
OM based on uniform probability densities in a 4-dimensional
ontic state space.
In Fig. (3) the the quantum probabilities and those ob-
tained for the d = 2 version of this OM are plotted. Un-
like the Kochen-Specker OM for a qubit this one does not
reproduce the quantum probabilities exactly. Fig. (4) is a
plot for the qutrit version of this OM - it essentially does
no worse than the original qutrit OM despite it utilizing
only uniform distributions. The interesting conclusion is
that something close to the desired sin/cos distributions
can be “inherited” in what I like to think of as a kind
of ‘concentration of measure’ effect (though I’m not sure
this is exactly what is going on, it is simply where the
intuition came from).
VI. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GENERAL
ONTOLOGICAL MODELS?
The Kochen-Specker theorem is essentially the only
nontrivial theorem known which affects any attempt
at constructing an ontological model (taking the view-
point that locality is simply a way of enforcing non-
contextuality in a natural manner, and Bell’s theorem
demonstrates the need for a violation of this).
For each quantum mechanical projector Π0 = |0〉〈0|,
a system prepared in |0〉 gives this outcome with proba-
bility 1, and in the OM’s presented here this is reflected
in the fact that
∫
P0(λ)χ0(λ)dλ = 1. Clearly, however,
P0(λ) must have support only over states faithful to λ0.
If not, then a system prepared in P0(λ) would sometimes
give an outcome different to χ0, were an observer to vary
over the multiple sets of measurements containing this
projector/central element. We see therefore that in the
OM’s considered here the strict inclusion holds:
supp (P0(λ)) ⊂ supp (χ0(λ)) .
(In the analogy of Figure 1 the boundary of the sup-
port of P0(λ) for ∆ = 1/2 is denoted by the blue line of
latitude - i.e the probability distributions have support
over the complete set of states faithful to their associated
measurement.)
One may well ask whether this strict inclusion is a
feature specific to these ontological models. In some re-
lated work [7] we show that in fact every reasonable on-
tological model of three or more dimensional quantum
systems must have this feature for an infinite number
(though perhaps not all) of the probability distributions
corresponding to quantum states. Interestingly, this is
proven by applying a Kochen-Specker style construction
to quantum preparation procedures instead of measure-
ments.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It would be nice to find an OM which is so close to
the quantum predictions that current experiments can-
not rule it out. (I am certainly interested in hearing
about present experimental bounds on how precisely the
Born rule is known to be satisfied in higher dimensional
systems - this can then give me a target to ‘shoot for’.)
On prime numbered days I am not even sure current
experiments rule out the OM’s discussed above. I have
played around with many variations on the sorts of OM I
have discussed here that use different spaces Λ, but have
not yet found an OM reproducing the quantum statistics
exactly for any dimension d. I know of no proof, however,
that such an OM cannot be lurking out there. I certainly
hope that one is – at present it seems the only way QM
can really make sense to me.
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